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The medical profession consistently strives to uphold patient empowerment, equality and safety. It is ironic
that now, at a time where advances in technology and knowledge have given us an increased capacity to
preserve and prolong life, we find ourselves increasingly asking questions about the value of the lives we are
saving. A recent editorial by Professor Raanan Gillon questions the emphasis that English law places on the
sanctity of life doctrine. In what was described by Reverend Nick Donnelly as a “manifesto for killing patients”,
Professor Gillon argues that the sanctity of life law has gone too far because of its disregard for distributive
justice and an incompetent person’s previously declared autonomy. This review begins by outlining the stance
of the sanctity of life doctrine on decisions about administering, withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging
treatment. Using this as a foundation for a rebuttal, a proposal is made that Professor Gillon’s assertions do
not take the following into account:
1) A sanctity of life law does not exist since English Common Law infringes the sanctity doctrine by tolerating quality
of life judgements and a doctor’s intention to hasten death when withdrawing life-prolonging treatment.
2) Even if a true sanctity of life law did exist:
a) The sanctity of life doctrine allows for resource considerations in the wider analysis of benefits and burdens.
b) The sanctity of life doctrine yields to a competent person’s autonomous decision.
This review attempts to demonstrate that at present, and with the legal precedent that restricts it, a sanctity
of life law cannot go too far.
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In a recent editorial published by the British Medical
Journal (BMJ) [1], Professor Raanan Gillon (Immediate
Past Chairman of the Institute of Medical Ethics and
Emeritus Professor of Medical Ethics at Imperial College
London) challenged the Honourable Mr Justice Baker’s
decision to reject an application to withdraw artificial nu-
trition and hydration (ANH) from a minimally conscious
woman. In what was the first case of its kind in English
law, the judge also declared that authorisation must be* Correspondence: rr1809@ic.ac.uk
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumsought from the Court of Protection before ANH is with-
held or withdrawn from all persons in a minimally con-
scious state (MCS) [2] (Table 1).
Using the ‘sanctity of life law’ to describe the application
of the sanctity of life doctrine in English law, Professor
Gillon argued on two accounts that the ruling in W v. M
and Others [2] shows that the “Sanctity of life law has
gone too far” [1]. Initially, he disagreed with the judge’s
decision not to “accord ‘significant weight’ to the patient’s
previously expressed values, wishes and views” [1]. Sub-
sequently, he proposed that the “logical implications of
this judgement threaten to skew the delivery of severely
limited services towards providing non-beneficial lifeentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited.
Table 1 Comparison of clinical features associated with vegetative state and minimally conscious state [3,4]
Condition Vegetative State (VS) Minimally Conscious State (MCS)
Awareness Absent Present
Sleep wake Cycle Present Present
Response to stimuli Inconsistent Present
Motor function No purposeful movement Some consistent or inconsistent verbal or
purposeful motor behaviour
Auditory Function Brief orienting to sound Localizes to sound location
Visual Function Brief visual fixation Sustained visual fixation and pursuit
Communication None Inconsistent, but intelligible verbalization or
gesture
Emotion None Smiling or crying
Respiratory function Typically preserved Typically Preserved
EEG Activity Typically slow wave activity Insufficient data
Cerebral metabolism Severely reduced Insufficient data
Variable Variable
Prognosis If permanent (>12 months of VS) then continued
vegetative state or death
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healthcare provision…values and common sense” [1].
It is possible that in developing his arguments, Professor
Gillon has misjudged some tenets of the sanctity of life
doctrine and their application in English law. To address
this matter fairly, this review is divided into three parts.
Part I outlines the Roman Catholic origin of the sanctity
of life doctrine in relation to decisions about administer-
ing, withholding and withdrawing treatment. Part II chal-
lenges the suggestion that English case law has put too
much emphasis on the sanctity of human life such that a
sanctity of life law exists, and Part III tackles Professor
Gillon’s argument that applying this sanctity of life law in
cases like W v. M and Others will have resource implica-
tions and wrongly reduce the weight ascribed to patients’
previous wishes and autonomy.
Part I: The sanctity of life doctrine
The fifth commandment of the Book of Exodus, “Thou shalt
not murder”, imposes an obligation not to act in a manner
that hastens the death of an innocent person. When asked if
this negative duty inferred a positive binding obligation to
preserve life, St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century an-
swered: “always, but not in every circumstance” [5].
St. Thomas set the foundation for subsequent discussions
about the sanctity of human life by asserting that there are
occasions when our life on earth can hinder our path to
God. In such circumstances, we can abandon the duty of
preserving life, a temporal good, for the attainment of man-
kind’s ultimate goal: God, and salvation of our soul [6,7].
Three centuries later, Spanish theologian Fransisco de
Vitoria provided guidance for deciding when there was nopositive duty to preserve life. He stated: “in order to pre-
serve life, it is not necessary to use all means but only
those which of themselves are both fitting and suitable”
[8]. De Vitoria explained that under normal circum-
stances, ordinary means – such as those that are easily
available and commonly used to preserve life – are obliga-
tory. In contrast, extraordinary means, which are neither
common nor easily available, are optional. He added that
in situations when ordinary means may impose excessive
burden on a person, it will be permissible and not a sin if
the person chooses not to use them [5].
The 17th century saw further development of the doc-
trine of ordinary and extraordinary means by Cardinal Juan
de Lugo who advised that since some means to preserve
life provide too slight a benefit to carry any moral weight,
one is not obliged to use them even if they are deemed to
be ordinary [5]. Such situations arise when a person is suf-
fering from a terminal illness and after comparing benefits
with burdens, we see that the progression to death is un-
affected by the best treatment available at that time.
In the face of 20th century medical advances, what was
once thought to be extraordinary could increasingly be
seen as ordinary. In his address to the International
Congress of Anaesthesiologists, Pope Pius XII confirmed
that “life, health, all temporal activities, are in fact subordi-
nated” to our spiritual welfare and the common good of
society [6]. He reiterated that ordinary means are those
that offer at least some hope of benefit whilst imposing
minimal burdens on the patient or others. Once the treat-
ment goes “beyond the ordinary means to which one is
bound, it cannot be held that there is an obligation to use
them” [6]; according to Pope Pius XII:
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according to circumstances of persons, places, times,
and culture…that do not involve any grave burden for
oneself or another” [6].
He explained that when assessing burdens placed on
others, our duty to preserve life and health requires that
we take “charity” and “social justice” into account [6].
Pope Pius’ allocution was followed by the Declaration
on Euthanasia which acknowledged that doubts about
the “fundamental values of human life” required Roman
Catholic principles to be clarified [7]. It reaffirmed that
“human life is the basis of all goods” which we are
“called upon to preserve and make fruitful” [7]. The
Declaration of Euthanasia ends by reiterating that whilst
“life is a gift from God”, “death is unavoidable”. In doing
so, it: (i) reminds us that we should not hasten death but
can accept it with dignity; (ii) provides justification for
not treating an “inevitable death” and (iii) explains why a
patient’s refusal of treatment is “not the equivalent of
suicide” but simply “an acceptance of the human condi-
tion, a wish to avoid application of a medical procedure
disproportionate to the results…expected, or a desire
not to impose excessive expense on family or the
community” [7].
The aim of this review is not to argue that the English
Law of modern, secular, 21-century United Kingdom
should be premised wholly upon the Roman Catholic
sanctity of life doctrine or that the medical profession
should aim to prolong life indefinitely. The degree to
which any community allows such principles to dictate
law is subject to an entirely different debate and al-
though the primary duty of a doctor is to care for the
health of his/her patient, without life, there is no pro-
spect of bettering health. This historical account of the
origins of sanctity of life doctrine provides the basis for
an analysis of the ‘sanctity of life law’ (as termed by
Professor Gillon) and its implications for autonomy and
distributive justice.
Part II: The sanctity of life doctrine is losing its
hold in English Law
The Homicide Act 1957 and Article 2 of the Human
Rights Act 1998 are prima facie evidence that English law
shows some commitment to the sanctity of life doctrine;
we collectively understand the value of life (regardless of
how happy, sad, healthy or sick a person is) and the need
to protect it from harm by others. However, it could be ar-
gued that courtroom decisions increasingly portray an in-
sidious erosion of respect for the sanctity of human life.
Nowadays, judges have replaced the church as being the
ultimate authority for clarifying and applying ethical prin-
ciples and have set contentious legal precedent over com-
plex questions about the preservation of life.Respect for the sanctity of human life has stumbled
upon a slippery slope and unfortunately, medical ethics
has ensued in a similar downfall [5]. Here, to show that
English law only gives partial respect to the sanctity of life
doctrine, the judgement made in Airedale NHS Trust v.
Bland [9] is explored.
The law before W v. M and others
Seventeen year old Anthony Bland was a victim of the
Hillsborough football disaster in April 1989 where he suf-
fered irreversible brain damage that left him in a perman-
ent vegetative state (PVS) (Table 1). After three years of
being kept alive by ANH and one-to-one nursing,
Anthony’s medical team and parents sought a declaration
from the High Court that they may lawfully terminate
ANH. They submitted that since robust medical evidence
and opinion indicated no prospect of improvement for
Bland, ANH withdrawal was in his best interest and in ac-
cordance with good medical practice [9].
Bland was the first case in English legal history to allow
the withdrawal of ANH from an incompetent adult pa-
tient. The declaration was granted at the High Court
(Family division) and on subsequent appeals, was unani-
mously affirmed at both the Court of Appeal and House
of Lords in February 1993. Anthony died one month later
on 3 March 1993.
The reasoning of the five Lords displayed a lack of ap-
preciation for the permanent and intrinsic good that the
sanctity of life doctrine bestows on human life. First, Lord
Keith declared that withdrawing ANH did “no violence to
the (sanctity of life) principle” as it conferred “no benefit”
upon Anthony and involved “manipulation” of his body
without consent [9]. Then, although Lord Goff tried to
point out the distinction between Bland and other cases
where quality of life judgments are made, he concluded
that prolonging Anthony’s life was “useless” since it repre-
sented “no more than a living death” [9].
The Lords did not see human life as inherently benefi-
cial. Their analysis, albeit a decade earlier, was not in line
with Pope John Paul II’s address in 2004 [10] where he
expounded that ANH should be considered ordinary and
proportionate in PVS patient insofar as they are not dying
and it attains its “proper finality…in providing nourish-
ment” [10]. It is clear from this that proper application of
the sanctity of life doctrine would have seen Anthony
Bland’s life as a benefit so long as his management was
not excessively burdensome to himself or others.
Three out of the five judges accepted that by with-
drawing ANH, there was intent to kill Anthony. Lord
Browne-Wilkonson stated:
“As to the element of intention or mens rea…the
whole purpose of stopping artificial feeding is to bring
about the death of Anthony Bland” [9].
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the judges held that an omission of treatment a doctor
deems not to be in a patient’s best interest does not
amount to the actus reus of murder.
Lord Mustill recognised that since Anthony had no
awareness, ending his life did “not relieve him of a
burden” [9] as it was those around him who carried
the burdens. He suggested that the verdict, which
rested on the distinction between acts and omission,
emphasised “the distortions of a legal structure which
is already both morally and intellectually misshapen”
[9]. He feared that the Bland case would create “a new
common-law exception to murder” that pointed the
development of English law in “new and…unforeseeable
directions” [9].
It appeared that the prediction made by Lord Mustill
was to be proven right. A year after Bland, Frenchay
Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [11] saw the courts grant a
declaration allowing doctors to lawfully refrain from rein-
serting a gastrostomy tube in a patient whose PVS diagno-
sis was not agreed by independent doctors. Sir Thomas
Bingham MR granted the application despite accepting
the evidence was “not as emphatic and not as unanimous
as that in Bland’s case” [11]. Even though erroneous diag-
nosis of PVS occurs in up to 43% of cases, [12,13] he dis-
missed an appeal on the grounds that time constraints
meant further investigations to establish if S. was actually
in PVS could not be performed.
This declaration clearly denied S. protection from
safeguards indicated by Lord Goff in Bland. Evidence
presented at Frenchay held that S.’s quality of life was
“nil” [11] and in similar circumstances where the diag-
nosis of PVS was uncertain (Re D. [Adult: medical
Treatment] [14]), Sir Stephen Brown authorised the re-
moval of ANH since, he believed, “there was no evi-
dence whatsoever of any meaningful life” [14]. Such
quality of life judgements and a disregard for the safe-
guards set out in Bland show that the sanctity of life
doctrine has been losing its hold in English law.
If law is to be taken as it stands, it then ought to be ac-
cepted that it tolerates quality of life judgements and al-
lows doctors to have the intention of hastening the death
of an incompetent person. English law has veered so much
and is not entirely in line with the sanctity doctrine. With
due respect to Professor Gillon, the precedence set before
W v. M and Others means that a true sanctity of life law
fails to exist. It has even been stated that “English law goes
too far” [15] by overstepping the boundaries of the sanc-
tity of life doctrine.
Part III: A sanctity of life law will not go ‘too far’
W v. M and others
In 2003, a 43-year old woman (M.) suffered irreparable
brain damage secondary to viral encephalitis. She emergedfrom the resulting coma but failed to regain full con-
sciousness and was entirely dependent on others for her
care. M. was initially diagnosed as being in a vegetative
state but further investigations revealed that she was in
fact in a minimally conscious state which, unlike PVS, has
the potential to improve [13] and contains “definite evi-
dence of awareness despite profound cognitive impair-
ment” [3,4].
In 2007, M.’s mother applied for a court order permit-
ting the withdrawal of ANH from her daughter. Reflecting
on M’s previous wishes, herself and other family members
believed that M. would not have wanted to be kept alive
in such circumstances and so, the withdrawal of medical
treatment was in her best interest under Section 4 of the
Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 [16].
The Honourable Mr Justice Baker refused the application
because he could not attach “significant weight” to “state-
ments made by M. prior to her illness” as they were “infor-
mal and not specifically addressed to the question” he was
tasked to decide on [2]. Moreover, M. lacked capacity to
make an autonomous decision and had not submitted a
formal advanced decision rejecting the use of life-
prolonging treatment. The decisive factor in his judg-
ment was the legal duty towards preservation of life. He
maintained that “although not an absolute rule, the law
regards the preservation of life as a fundamental
principle” [2].
W v. M and Others employed the desired application of
the sanctity of life doctrine as outlined in Part I. Adopting
a balance-sheet approach, the judge acknowledged that in
PVS cases, the balance always falls in favour of withdraw-
ing AHN because of medical opinion, the patient’s lack of
awareness, and legal precedent. On the other hand, in
MCS cases, “it depends on the facts and expert evidence
in the particular case” [2]. In fact, Lord Mustill (in Bland)
stated that he may not reach the same conclusion in cases
such as W v. M and Others “where the glimmerings of
awareness may give the patient an interest which cannot
be regarded as null” [9].
The best interest analysis was extensive, taking into ac-
count preservation of life, M.’s and her family’s wishes,
pain, enjoyment of life, the prospect of recovery and dig-
nity. Baker J acknowledged the advantages of withdrawing
ANH and expert opinion that “M’s experiences were pre-
dominantly negative”. He weighed these against evidence
that M was “clinically stable, aware of herself and environ-
ment”, [2] able to “express emotion”, “experience pleas-
ure” and in short, was “recognisably alive in a way that a
patient in VS is not” [2].
A sanctity of life law will not distort healthcare provisions
The sanctity of life doctrine should be clearly distin-
guished from vitalism. It holds that whilst human life pos-
sesses an intrinsic good which should be protected, it is
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end of life and an expression of human finitude” [18]; to
intentionally hasten death or impose life unnecessarily
would be to challenge God’s sovereignty.
Vitalism, on the other hand, sees human life as an
absolute good that should be preserved at all costs.
Keown describes vitalism as being “ethically untenable”
since “its attempt to maintain life indefinitely is physic-
ally impossible” [17]. The sanctity of life doctrine is not
vitalistic because there is no moral obligation to preserve
life by means that are excessively costly, complex, dan-
gerous or unusual when weighed against anticipated
benefits [18].
Professor Gillon’s assertion that the sanctity of life law
imposes opportunity costs overlooks the fact that in
assessing whether a means of preserving life is dispro-
portionate, the sanctity of life doctrine requires an
altruistic, unselfish and charitable consideration of the
economic implications on resources, family and commu-
nity. Although cost and distributive justice should be
taken into account, they – like other factors – must not
be applied alone. Public bodies such as NICE (National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence) use these prin-
ciples in conjunction with other burdens relating “to
circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture” [6]
to appraise the cost-effectiveness of treatment and ul-
timately, prolonging life. In addition, the GMC advice
doctors not to withdraw or withhold treatment when the
“only justification is resource constraints” but instead to
provide a good standard of care whilst balancing “duties
towards the wider population, funding bodies and em-
ployers” [19].
In fact, in an earlier paper, Professor Gillon recognised
that an approach based on the doctrine of ordinary and
extraordinary means “is entirely consistent” with “respect
for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice”
[20]. Now he argues that the logical implication of this
judgement will “skew the delivery of severely resource-
limited healthcare services” [1] since the protection given
to M. should, a fortiori, extend to those in a higher than
minimal state of consciousness. Even if this was the case,
the cost to society would be a justifiable one if it deters or
exposes the actions of medical professionals who are
happy to withdraw ANH in less ill patients who need it
for nourishment, knowing that death will be the eventual
consequence of its removal.
Furthermore, the sanctity of life doctrine and medical
opinion (which the courts have heavily relied upon in such
cases) recognise, that tube feeding can confer great phys-
ical and psycho-social burdens especially in patients who
are more aware. Withdrawing ANH in such circumstances
where there is a net harm – unlike in the case of M. –
would be morally acceptable and would dampen oppor-
tunity costs.A sanctity of life law will respect self-determination
In arguing that the ‘Sanctity of life law has gone too far’,
Professor Gillon implies that the judge’s decision not to
“accord ‘significant weight’ to (M.’s) expressed values,
wishes and views” [1] portrayed a lack of respect for previ-
ous autonomy and right to self-determination.
In English law, the sanctity of life doctrine yields to the
self-determination or autonomy in two ways: (i) refusal
from a competent adult or (ii) through a valid and applic-
able advanced directive. As explained by de Vitoria and
summarised in the Declaration on Euthanasia, a compe-
tent adult can refuse life-saving treatment without com-
mitting the sin of suicide on the grounds that he or she
has considered the potential benefits and burdens of treat-
ment for themselves and others involved.
It could be argued that by allowing such decisions, we
may mask quality of life judgements. But this counter ar-
gument strengthens the claim that the hold of the sanc-
tity of life doctrine on English law is relatively weak,
unclear and fluctuating. Although the doctrine does not
allow quality of life considerations, the law requires that
no matter how irrational a decision is, it must be accepted
as long as it does not infringe on the rights of others.
When a patient loses capacity to make a current deci-
sion or has not submitted an advanced decision repre-
senting a previous choice, the MCA states that an “act
done or decision made…must be…in his best interest”
[16]. Although the term ‘best interest’ is not defined in
statute, it is accepted that it is not a substituted judg-
ment. Instead, the decision maker must consider “the
person’s past and present wishes and feelings…beliefs
and values…and other factors that he would be likely to
consider if he were able to” [16]. He or she then has the
task of giving these factors weight in the balancing exer-
cise, must not discriminate merely on the basis of the
patient’s age, appearance, condition or behaviour, and
must not be “motivated by a desire to bring about death”
[16]. Following the recommendations set out in the
MCA and the strong, but not absolute, interest of
the state in preserving life, it is therefore the role of
the judge to ascribe appropriate weight to evidence sub-
mitted in the courtroom.
The Honourable Mr Justice Baker clearly acknowledged
and accepted that M.’s sister and mother “accurately
relayed…statements made by M. in the past” [2] but as
these statements were informal and did not concern with-
drawing ANH or being in a minimally conscious state, he
deemed it “wrong to attach significant weight” [2] to them.
This was not a judgement declaring that the previous
wishes of adults lacking capacity are insignificant, but
merely a statement showing that in this particular case, it
was relatively weak when compared to “the importance of
the sanctity of life and fatal consequences of withdrawing
treatment” [2].
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best interest. If – by challenging autonomy and using
resource-limited services – we do not go ‘too far’ when
stopping competent individuals from ending their lives be-
cause their experiences are “predominately negative”, [2] it
should follow that we should not make such a fatal deci-
sion on behalf of an incompetent adult. In light of prog-
nostic uncertainty, paucity in MCS research, and the
undue weight some medical professionals might give to
resource implications, an ethically correct and “clear con-
clusion” [2] was made in this particular case.
Conclusion
The sanctity of life doctrine has been misinterpreted and
overlooked to an extent that limits its application in the
courtroom. English law permits judgements based on
quality of life decisions and by legally justifying their ac-
tions as being in the patients’ best interests, allows doc-
tors to have the intention of hastening death when
withdrawing life-prolonging treatment.
Even if English Law was premised on the sanctity doc-
trine, a sanctity of life law will account for resource alloca-
tions and give respect to self-determination. Ultimately,
morals determine how much society can tolerate the in-
fluence of the sanctity of life doctrine before we say it
has gone too far. Some people will welcome Baker J’s
judgement in W v. M and Others as a positive step in
returning common law to its “former, coherent, shape”
[17]. Some, like Professor Gillon, may not. Neverthe-
less, at present, and with the legal precedent that re-
stricts it, a sanctity of life law does not exist and if it
did, it could not go too far.
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